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Abstract 
This paper examines some common explanations for the earnings gap between males and 
females.  Over recent decades, the average pay of women has increased faster than the average 
pay of men; however, a substantial earnings gap remains.  As of 2006, the U.S. Census estimated 
that for year-round full-time workers the earnings ratio of women to men was 77%; in other 
words, for every one dollar a man earns, a woman earns $0.77.  The wage gap likely consists of 
both non-discriminatory and discriminatory aspects, and concern remains over how much of the 
gender wage gap is caused by discrimination against women.  However, the part of the wage gap 
due to discrimination cannot be measured directly, so it is typically interpreted as the portion of 
the gap that is “unexplained” by other factors.  Numerous economists and sociologists have 
studied this issue, but their conclusions differ vastly.  This paper discusses various economic 
explanations for the gender pay gap, both discriminatory and non-discriminatory.  It also briefly 
summarizes some sociological responses to economic arguments, as well as some policy 
recommendations and their possible implications.   
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
“If all the economists were laid end to end, they’d never reach a conclusion.”   
 -George Bernard Shaw 
 
“Give a scientist a problem and he will probably provide a solution; historians and sociologists, 
by contrast, can offer only opinions. Ask a dozen chemists the composition of an organic 
compound such as methane, and within a short time all twelve will have come up with the same 
solution of CH4. Ask, however, a dozen economists or sociologists to provide policies to reduce 
unemployment or the level of crime and twelve widely differing opinions are likely to be 
offered.” 
 -Derek Gjertsen (British scientist and author) 
 
 Economic issues often have complex and elusive explanations.  Therefore, it is no 
surprise that multiple intelligent and knowledgeable people can reach vastly different 
conclusions.  The issue of the gender wage gap is one such subject.  Numerous economists have 
conducted studies on the earnings of women compared to men.  Some of their findings are the 
same, but the most debated aspect involves the portion of the pay gap between men and women 
that seems to be “unexplained.”  How much of the gap is due to discrimination?  Are there 
reasonable market justifications?  Can, or should, anything be done about it?  Sociologists often 
examine this same issue, but from a different perspective.  This paper will discuss various 
economic explanations for the gender pay gap, both discriminatory and non-discriminatory.  It 
will also briefly summarize some sociological responses to economic arguments, as well as some 
policy recommendations and their possible implications.   
Background Information on the Gender Pay Ratio 
The gender pay ratio can be measured several ways, including hourly, weekly, and annual 
earnings.  The U.S. Census Bureau collects data on the annual earnings of full-time year round 
workers.  (Full-time is defined as working 35 or more hours per week.)  According to the Census 
Bureau, the gender earnings ratio of women to men was roughly 60% from the late 1950’s to the 
early 1980’s.  The gap then narrowed substantially, and by 2006 the ratio stood at about 77% 
(CPS Report 2006).  The pay gap is smaller when weekly earnings are used.  The Bureau of 
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Labor Statistics collects data on the weekly earnings of full-time year round workers.  The ratio 
still hovered around 60% through the 1970’s, and then climbed to 70% by 1990 and 80% by 
2006.  (Highlight of Women’s Earnings 2006) 
 
Figure 1.1: Median Annual Earnings Ratio (full-time year round workers) 
Median Annual Earnings of Females 
Relative to Men
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
 
 Source data: Current Population Survey, 2006. 
 
Figure 1.2: Median Weekly Earnings Ratio (full-time year round workers) 
Median Weekly Earnings of Females 
Relative to Males
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Source data: Highlight of Women’s Earnings, 2006. 
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Figure 1.3: Median Hourly Earnings Ratio (full-time year round workers) 
Median Hourly Earnings of Females 
Relative to Males
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 Source data: Highlight of Women’s Earnings, 2006. 
 
As can be seen in the above figures, the pay ratio is highest (i.e., the wage gap is 
smallest) when hourly earnings are used.  This is likely because, on average, males tend to work 
more hours per week than females.  According to the American Time Use Survey from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2006 full-time males worked an average of 8.44 hours a day, 
whereas full-time females worked an average of 7.65 hours a day (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2006).  This amounts to an average of 42.2 average weekly hours for males and 38.25 
weekly hours for females.  This translates into difference of 3.95 hours a week.  Therefore, the 
median weekly and annual earnings for females will naturally be a little lower than for males, 
causing a wider pay gap.  If women and men are willingly choosing those hours, then the weekly 
and annual earnings ratio will overestimate the pay gap.   
Although the gender pay ratio has improved in recent years, there still remains concern 
about whether discrimination plays a substantial role in the difference between female and male 
earnings. 
Difficulties With Measuring the Pay Gap 
Much of the reason there remains so much debate about the gender earnings gap is that 
multiple factors are interacting in complex ways.  It is difficult to gather comprehensive data on 
the differences men and women bring into the labor market (such as experience, productivity, 
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personality, preferences, etc.)  Also, it is impossible to measure “discrimination” directly.  
Economists can run wage regressions to determine how much of the wage can be explained by 
certain variables (such as number of hours worked, educational level, tenure, etc.)  However 
there is no “variable” to measure discrimination.  Therefore, after all other factors have been 
controlled for in the regression, the rest of the gap (the “unexplained” portion) is often attributed 
to discriminatory practices (such as direct employer discrimination or occupational barriers).  
The problem with regressions is that the appropriate relevant variables to include are difficult 
both to determine and gather data on.  Therefore, even the most detailed studies cannot provide 
irrefutable proof of either discrimination or the reasons behind it.  Subsequently, the explanations 
of the pay gap are debatable and indeterminate.  This paper will explore several of these 
explanations. 
 
CHAPTER 2 - Economic Explanations 
Numerous economists have conducted studies that can account for much of the pay gap.  
The debate arises about whether these reasons have discriminatory components.  The first part of 
this section will discuss the common non-discriminatory reasons for the earnings difference.  The 
second part will discuss how gender discrimination may play a role. 
Non-Discriminatory Factors 
Human Capital 
One of the most researched explanations is the differences in human capital between men 
and women.  Human capital is the “investment” workers make in themselves in order to improve 
their skills, productivity, and thus lifetime earnings.  For example education, training, and years 
of experience are the most common forms of human capital.  Men and women can differ in both 
the amount of human capital attained (years of education) and type of human capital attained 
(field of study).  However, the amount of human capital attained (as measured by education) is 
very similar between men and women.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, data from the 
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2007 Current Population Survey indicates that women actually outnumber men in most 
educational categories, including masters’ degrees.   
 
Figure 2.1: Educational Attainment 
Educational Attainment of Population 18 
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Source data: Current Population Survey, 2007. 
 
However, the United States population also consists of more women than men: 
107,843,000 men compared to 114,880,000 women, which means about 52% of the population 
are female (CPS 2007).  When percentages are used, it is still clear that women comprise a larger 
portion of each category than men up to and including master’s degree.  However, women are 
disproportionately over-represented in associate’s degree categories.  Conversely, women are 
severely under-represented in the categories of professional and doctoral degrees.  Only about 
35% of professional degrees and 33% of doctoral degrees are awarded to women. 
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Figure 2.2: Percent Female in Each Educational Category 
Percent Female in Each Category (2007)
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Source data: Current Population Survey, 2007. 
 
It is important to note that while education levels appear similar in 2007, the educational 
attainment of men and women twenty to thirty years ago was different.  Even though those 
differences have been mostly eliminated now, current earnings may still reflect some of the past 
educational advantages of men.  Furthermore, it is notable that the two categories where men 
have attained more human capital than women (professional degree and doctoral degree) contain 
many of the relatively high-paying jobs.   
Even though the amount of educational human capital is fairly similar now for men and 
women, the type of human capital attained is still very different.  Women are disproportionately 
concentrated in college majors in the humanities, education, and social sciences departments, 
which lead to relatively low-paying occupations.  Men are more likely to receive degrees in 
mathematics, sciences, or engineering fields, which lead to relatively high paying occupations.     
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Table 2.1: Percent Women by Educational Field 
U.S. Population, Age 18 and 
Over with Bachelor’s Degrees (2004)
  
Degree Field Percent Women 
  
Agriculture 24% 
Architecture 53% 
Business 41% 
Communications 54% 
Computer 30% 
Education 80% 
Engineering 14% 
Literature 70% 
Foreign language 80% 
Health sciences 83% 
Liberal arts 58% 
Mathematics 35% 
Natural science 47% 
Philosophy 48% 
Pre-professional 62% 
Psychology 72% 
Social science 56% 
Other 49% 
  
Total 52% 
Source data: U.S. Census Bureau, 2004 Panel of Program Participation. 
 
Paglin and Rufolo (1990) argue that quantitative ability is a scarce attribute that impacts 
an occupation’s pay.  “Students who work in areas requiring a greater degree of mathematical 
ability will achieve a higher rate of return to their investment in human capital than students who 
generate a type of human capital that makes less use of mathematical ability” (Paglin and Rufolo 
1990, p. 141).  They find that males are disproportionately present in the high end of the 
distribution for mathematical aptitude (as measured by SAT mathematical and GRE quantitative 
scores), while females are disproportionately in the low end of the distribution.  Therefore, the 
market can explain why females generally earn less than males.   
Fields with a high proportion of women are not lower paying than other fields because of 
“crowding” brought on by discriminatory exclusion; they are lower paying because the 
human capital in these fields can be produced with less of an important scarce attribute 
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(quantitative ability)… Similarly, graduates in physical science and engineering are not 
paid more because of the high proportion of men in these fields but because the 
production of human capital in these areas requires a much higher than average level of 
mathematical ability. (Paglin and Rufolo 1990, p. 138) 
In other words, males are more likely than females to obtain high math scores; therefore 
they are more likely to go into the fields of study requiring more quantitative ability.  These 
fields of study tend to result in the higher paying jobs.  The reason males are receiving higher 
math scores is unclear.  It may not be that males are intrinsically better at math than females, but 
rather that more males tend to pursue mathematical education in high school (for a variety of 
sociological reasons).   
Polachek (1981) has another explanation for why women choose to acquire different 
kinds of human capital: women rationally choose occupations that will maximize their lifetime 
earnings.  If women expect their employment to be intermittent due to domestic responsibilities, 
they will choose a job with low penalties for intermittent employment.  “If lifetime labor force 
participation differs across individuals, then occupational variations in the cost of labor force 
intermittency will cause an individual to choose that occupation that imposes the smallest 
penalty given his desired lifetime participation, ceteris paribus” (Polachek 1981, p. 64).  In other 
words, women choose different fields of study because they will lead to occupations that 
optimize lifetime earnings.  According to this theory, jobs with low penalties for intermittent 
employment will offer higher starting wages, but have a relatively flat wage trajectory, ceteris 
paribus.  Jobs requiring significant lifetime commitment would tend to offer lower starting wages 
but steep wage trajectories (particularly those involving on-the-job training). 
Mincer and Ofek (1982) also discuss the penalties for intermittent employment.  They 
show that human capital depreciates (skills are lost) while that person is out of the workforce.  
They observe that wages are typically lower at the point of workforce reentry than they were 
before the labor force withdrawal.  After the person reenters the workforce, wages tend to grow 
relatively rapidly.  “This rapid growth appears to reflect the restoration (or ‘repair’) of previously 
eroded human capital” (Mincer and Ofek 1982, p.3).  The loss of human capital due to workforce 
nonparticipation has a significantly negative impact on wages.  Mincer and Ofek find that in the 
short run, spending one year out of the labor force causes between a 5.6% and 5.9% loss in 
wages (Mincer and Ofek 1982, p. 11).  In the long run, one year out of the labor force causes a 
1.5% and 1.8% loss in wages, even after the depreciated human capital has been restored 
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(Mincer and Ofek 1982, p. 11).  Using this information, the following inference can be made: if 
women expect their employment to be intermittent, they will prefer to acquire a type of human 
capital with a relatively low rate of depreciation.   
Moreover, the longer the interruption that is observed, the more likely it is that the 
returnees are people whose human capital is especially durable, whether it is a matter of 
personal resiliency (good memory) or environment (lesser changes in the field, or special 
opportunities that have arisen for them. (Mincer and Ofek 1982, p. 18) 
Therefore, an occupation such as “high-school English teacher” may seem more 
appealing than “computer programmer.” 
Occupational Segregation (Due to Preference) 
As alluded to previously, women obtain different types of human capital and are thus 
segregated into different occupations.  Occupational differences account for a major portion of 
the earnings difference between men and women, as the most common female occupations tend 
to be lower paying than male occupations.  The table below shows some selected occupations 
with at least 1,000,000 workers.  The percent female as well as the median weekly earnings (for 
both sexes) is displayed for three sections: occupations with the highest proportion female, the 
highest paying occupations, and the occupations with the lowest proportion female.  The data 
was taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics January 2008 publication, Employment and 
Earnings (Household Data Annual Averages, tables 11 and 39). 
 
Table 2.2: Occupational Composition and Earnings 
Occupation Percent Female Median Weekly Earnings 
 
Highest Percent Female   
Dental Hygienists 99.2 $946 
Preschool and Kindergarten Teachers 97.3 $567 
Secretaries and Administrative Assistants 96.7 $599 
Child care workers 94.6 $368 
Licensed Practical and Vocational Nurses 93.2 $668 
Receptionists and Information Clerks 93.0 $482 
Hairdressers, Hairstylists, and Cosmetologists 92.9 $425 
Registered Nurses 91.7 $984 
Maids and Housekeeping Cleaners 89.2 $366 
Paralegals and Legal Assistants 88.4 $797 
 9
Nursing, Psychiatric, and Home Health Aides 88.3 $423 
Dietitians and Nutritionists 87.6 $734 
Tellers 87.5 $455 
 
Highest Paying   
Chief Executive 25.6 $1882 
Pharmacist 53.3 $1838 
Lawyer 32.6 $1591 
Aerospace Engineers 10.5 $1557 
Computer Information Systems Manager 27.8 $1553 
Physician and Surgeon 30.0 $1475 
Computer Software Engineer 20.8 $1455 
Database Administrator 35.9 $1345 
Marketing and Sales Manager 38.8 $1319 
 
Lowest Percent Female   
Electrical and Electronics Engineers 8.6 $1454 
Construction Managers 8.1 $1143 
Engineering Managers 8.0 $1713 
Mechanical Engineers 7.3 $1354 
Janitors and Building Cleaners 5.9 $434 
Grounds Maintenance Workers  5.9 $420 
Fire Fighters 5.3 $901 
Truck Drivers 5.3 $665 
Aircraft Pilots and Flight Engineers 4.2 $1358 
Construction Laborers 2.7 $514 
Aircraft Mechanics and Service Technicians 2.1 $889 
Carpenters 1.9 $615 
Electricians 1.7 $805 
Roofers 0.9 $550 
Automotive Service Technicians and Mechanics 0.7 $655 
Highway Maintenance Workers 0.5 $621 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings 2008. 
 
There are two non-discriminatory explanations for the lower pay of predominately female 
occupations.  The first is compensating wage differentials.  Females may choose jobs with more 
comfortable and less hazardous work conditions, which will ceteris paribus lead to lower wages.  
“If women care more about non-pecuniary rewards (such as avoiding physical danger or having 
mother-friendly work conditions) than men, while men focus more on maximizing earnings, then 
women will trade off earnings for amenities by choosing safer, more mother-friendly jobs” 
(England 2005, p. 277).   Some studies have found that women highly value geographic 
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proximity to family.  Therefore, women may accept a lower paying job in their desired location, 
rather than relocate for a higher paying job.   Another form of compensating wage differentials is 
flexibility and time off.  Women may prefer the lower paying but more flexible jobs; they value 
the ease of placing work below family demands.  Also, women are disproportionately present in 
the educational sector, which means they may value having summers off to spend with their 
children.  A second explanation for the lower pay in “female” occupations is the supply-demand 
model.  If the skills and human capital required for a job are relatively common (such as a 
general associate’s or bachelor’s degree), then the supply of qualified workers will be greater, 
resulting in a lower wage.  However, if the type of human capital needed is very difficult to 
achieve (such as a mathematical engineering degree), then the low supply of qualified workers 
will result in a higher wage. 
As for why females tend to be segregated into different occupations, several non-
discriminatory explanations exist.  As Polachek and Mincer (1974) argued, females are choosing 
the occupations that tend to be the most “mother-friendly” and offer the smallest penalty for 
intermittent employment.  Females may choose occupations that will likely maximize lifetime 
earnings rather than occupations that simply have the highest wage.   
Solberg (2004) offers a model relating past occupational preference to current 
occupation.  He uses data from the 1991 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, where 
respondents were asked what they would like to be doing at age 35 if they were to or had to 
work.  He finds a correspondence between past occupational preference and current assignment.  
He also finds little evidence of hiring discrimination, and one of his models finds that 
discrimination could account for as little as 2.2% of the earnings gap between men and women.   
In any case, the evidence clearly indicates that preference plays a role in the 
determination of occupational outcome which in turn plays a role in the determination of 
wages… Occupational preference and the acquisition of human capital may have been 
conditioned by past discrimination, but the effects of such conditioning have not been 
measured in this study.  Nevertheless, there is weak evidence in this study that females 
are treated differently from males in attaining their desired occupation. (Solberg 2004, p. 
24) 
As Solberg mentions, past discrimination may have played a role in the types of jobs 
females aspire to, but there is little evidence to suggest current market discrimination is a major 
factor causing the gender earnings difference.  (The role of past socialization and pre-market 
discrimination will be discussed in the next section.) 
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Discriminatory Factors 
Occupational Segregation (Due to Societal Norms or Entry Barriers) 
Other economists have argued that occupational segregation is determined primarily by 
societal norms (which influence “preferences”), socialization, and hiring discrimination.  “We 
can conjecture that earmarking of paid jobs by sex has its origin in social systems that decree that 
women are and should be inferior in status to men, and in ideas about differences in aptitude and 
abilities between the sexes” (Bergmann 1989, p. 49).  If women are taught at a young age about 
what types of jobs are socially acceptable for women, they will naturally gravitate towards those 
positions, which usually involve caretaking and nurturing aspects.  This raises a complicated 
question: are women’s preferences really their own or have they been largely shaped by societal 
forces?  If “preferences” were not developed freely, then pre-market discrimination plays a 
significant role in a woman’s choice of occupation. 
Another explanation for occupational segregation is the barriers to entry that may lead to 
crowding in the female occupations.  Barbara Bergmann has conducted extensive research in this 
area.  If women are prevented from obtaining typical “male” jobs, they will be disproportionately 
forced into the typical female occupations.  The high supply of workers in these occupations will 
result in a lower wage.  Conversely, the lower supply of workers in the male occupations will 
result in a higher wage.  Barriers to entry can be anything from discriminatory job requirements 
(being able to lift and carry 100 pounds) to psychological deterrents (harassment in the 
workplace).   
Perhaps one of the best illustrations of barriers to entry is the case involving the New 
York City Fire Department in the late 1970’s.  The occupation of firefighter (usually referred to 
as “fireman”) is typically associated with males.  In 1977, the New York City Fire Department 
began looking for new recruits.  However, they could no longer legally prevent women from 
applying.  As women started applying to be a firefighter, the Fire Department came up with a 
new entrance exam, one that was more physically demanding than any test given in the past.  All 
90 women who took the new physical test (Exam 3040) failed.  Brenda Berkman (one of the 
applicants) filed a class-action suit against the City and the Fire Department.  The lawsuit 
examined a series of physical tests given in Exam 3040 and argued that those tests had little to do 
with a firefighter’s ability to perform the job.  In 1982, Judge Charles Sifton ruled in favor of 
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Berkman, and the city was forced to revise the exam.  When the “legal” barrier to entry was 
removed and women began joining the Fire Department, another type of barrier to entry arose: 
harassment.   
Once in the firehouses, the women faced an array of hostile acts.  Their safety equipment 
was constantly tampered with by male firefighters.  On several occasions, the women 
rushed into burning buildings only to realize that someone had bled all the air out of their 
tanks.  There were incidents of women being excluded from training and meals, and 
subjected to obscenity, verbal abuse, physical violence, death threats and even sexual 
molestations. (Public Broadcast System 1993) 
Despite these conditions, some women firefighters persisted, and Brenda Berkman is now 
a captain with more than twenty years of experience.  However, as the previous table indicated, 
as of 2007 women make up only 5.3% of all firefighters.  It is likely that barriers to entry still 
exist in many of the “masculine” occupations. 
Family and Childrearing Responsibilities 
Family status has a different implication on earnings for females than it does for males.  
Married men with children tend to have higher earnings than unmarried men (CEA 1998).  
However, married women with children tend to have lower earnings than single women without 
children.  The reason children are associated with lower wages for women but not for men is that 
women generally bear a majority of the childrearing responsibility.  The American Time Use 
Survey of 2006 (conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) found that married women who 
were employed full-time and lived in a household with young children spent an average of 1.5 
hours per day on household activities (cooking, housework, etc.) and 1.9 hours per day caring for 
household children (ATUS Care of Household Children).  Specific data for married, full-time 
employed men with young children was not available.  However, employed men with a child 
under six spent an average of 1.16 hours per day on household activities (compared to 1.92 hours 
for employed women with a child under six), and 1.05 hours caring for household children 
(compared to 1.86 for women) (ATUS 2006, table 8).  Women are more likely to either drop out 
of the labor force or reduce number of hours worked when they have young children.  Employed 
women living in a household with a child under 6 worked an average of one hour less per day 
than employed women without children.  However, employed men with a young child worked 
about the same amount as men in a household without young children (ATUS Work and 
Employment).   
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As mentioned previously, Mincer and Ofek (1982) found a significant wage penalty for 
intermittent employment.  If a woman drops out of the labor force temporarily she not only 
becomes relatively less experienced, but her human capital depreciates, causing her wages upon 
reentry to be lower.   
Budig and England (2001) found evidence of a significant wage penalty for motherhood.  
They argued that motherhood is not just correlated with lower wages, but it actually causes lower 
wages.  They built upon a previous study by Waldfogel (1997) that found a 6% wage penalty for 
mothers with one child and a 13% wage penalty for mothers with two or more children (after 
controlling for marital status, experience, and education).  Budig and England use a similar 
fixed-effects regression model with data from the 1982-1993 National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth.  They examine the effect of children on wages using a fixed-effects model that controls 
for “effects of unchanging aspects of cognitive aptitude, preferences resulting from early 
socialization, life cycle plans, tastes for affluence, future orientation, and other unmeasured 
human capital” (Budig and England 2001, p. 213).  The analysis is conducted several times; once 
without any controls (except person-specific and year-specific fixed-effects), and then again 
while adding control variables for marital status, human capital variables, and job characteristics.  
The coefficients on the effect of number of children on women’s hourly wage are shown in the 
table below.  (All were significant at the p<.01 level, as denoted by the “**”.)   
 
Table 2.3: Effect of Number of Children on Women's Hourly Earnings 
Control Variables in Model Fixed-Effects Coefficient 
Gross (no controls) -.068** 
Marital Status -.073** 
Marital Status and Human Capital 
Variables -.047** 
Marital Status, Human Capital 
Variables, and Job Characteristics -.037** 
Source: Budig and England 2001, p. 213 
 
 14
In general, the wage penalty for motherhood is around 7% per child.  The penalty is 
reduced to 4.7% when controlling for human capital variables (education, full-time seniority, 
part-time seniority, full-time experience, part-time experience, number of breaks in employment, 
and whether currently enrolled in school).  The addition of numerous job characteristics (QES 
and DOT measures, whether the current job is part-time, percent female of the occupation, and 
dummies for industry, whether the job is in government, unionized, in a child care occupation, or 
self-employment) further reduces the motherhood wage penalty to 3.7% per child.  Budig and 
England suggest that this penalty arises from the effects of motherhood on productivity and/or 
from employer discrimination.   
In an earlier study, Mincer and Polachek (1974) also analyzed the effect of marriage and 
children on women’s earnings.  They concluded that after marriage, women spend less than half 
of their lifetime participating in the labor market (on average).  This reduction in labor force 
participation is made up of working fewer years in a lifetime, fewer weeks in a year, fewer hours 
in a week, and multiple entries and exits from the workforce (Mincer and Polachek 1974, p. 80).  
In Mincer and Polachek’s analysis, the coefficient of home time is negative, which implies a net 
depreciation of earnings power.  The home-time interval associated with marriage or the birth of 
the first child has different effects for women with different levels of schooling.  For women 
with less than a high school education, the net depreciation is relatively small: -0.2% per year.  
For those with 12-15 years of schooling, the effect is larger: -1.3% per year.  Finally, women 
with 16 or more years of schooling experience the largest net depreciation of earnings: -2.3% per 
year (Mincer and Polachek 1974, p. 91).   
Mincer and Polachek allude to the possibility that family responsibilities are an 
underlying cause of the entire wage gap.   
At this stage of research we cannot conclude that the remaining (unexplained) part of the 
wage gap is attributable to discrimination, nor, for that matter, that the “explained” part is 
not affected by discrimination… Of course, if division of labor in the family is equated 
with discrimination, all of the gap is by definition a symptom of discrimination. (Mincer 
and Polachek 1974, p. 103-104)  
Miller (2006) finds that motherhood reduces both levels and slopes of age-wage profiles.  
She measures the cost of a work interruption as the sum of the foregone wages and the foregone 
human capital accumulation.  She presents evidence that a woman’s age at the birth of her first 
child has a significant effect on career earnings and post-motherhood wages.  Miller concludes 
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that delaying motherhood leads to a substantial increase in career earnings by 10% per year and 
an increase in wage rates of 3% per year.  In other words, early motherhood is not just correlated 
with low wages, but actually causes them (Miller 2006, p. 4).  
According to England (2005), the fact that women still tend to bear most of the 
responsibility for childrearing directly affects “employment continuity, part-time job choice, and 
exclusivity of career focus,” all of which are important contributors to the sex gap in earnings 
(England 2005, p. 280).   
 Crittenden (2001) suggests that the comparison of men’s and women’s hourly earnings 
using full-time workers underestimates the gender wage gap, since only about half of the 
mothers of children under eighteen have full-time, year-round paying jobs (Crittenden 2001, p. 
93).   
To find the real difference between men’s and women’s earnings, one would have to 
compare the earnings of all male and female workers, both full- and part-time.  And 
guess what one discovers? The average earnings of all female workers in 1999 were 59 
percent of men’s earnings.  Women who work for pay are still stuck at the age-old 
biblical value put on their labor. (Crittenden 2001, p. 93) 
Crittenden also examines the forgone income associated with motherhood; she refers to it 
as a “mommy tax” and estimates it to be more than $1 million for a college-educated American 
woman (Crittenden 2001, p. 5).  Crittenden supports her estimate with similar findings.  Burggraf 
calculated that “a husband and wife who earn a combined income of $81,500 per year and who 
are equally capable will lose $1.35 million if they have a child.  Most of that lost income is the 
wages forgone by the primary parent” (Crittenden 2001, p. 89).  Inflexible workplaces cause 
women to cut back on, or quit, their employment once they have children.  Crittenden argues that 
this “mommy tax” is a significant contributor to the wage gap between men and women.  She 
presents evidence from Sweden where family division of labor is more equal and parental leaves 
(for the mother and the father) are subsidized.  “Swedish women on average have higher 
incomes, vis-à-vis men, than women anywhere else in the world” Crittenden 2001, p. 248).   
Hiring Discrimination 
Some studies have shown that women may be victims of hiring discrimination.  Goldin 
and Rouse (1997) found that when orchestras began conducting “blind” auditions with a screen 
hiding the candidate’s identity, the probability that a woman would advance from certain 
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preliminary rounds increased by 50%.  Previous hiring procedures consisted of a male director 
favoring his own (typically male) students.  In 1970, female musicians comprised only 5% of the 
top five orchestras in the United States.  The introduction of “blind” auditions greatly increased 
the proportion of female musicians because discrimination was common among the most 
renowned conductors.  Typical stereotypes included, “women have smaller techniques than 
men,” “are more temperamental and more likely to demand special attention or treatment,” and 
“the more women [in an orchestra] the poorer the sound” (Goldin and Rouse 1997, p. 6).  Goldin 
and Rouse estimate that the screened auditions can explain 25% to 46% of the increase in female 
orchestra members since 1970.   
Neumark, Bank, and Van Nort (1996) also found evidence of sex discrimination in 
hiring.  They conducted an audit study in which female and male applicants submitted essentially 
identical resumes for restaurant jobs.  They found that women were 40% less likely than men to 
receive a job offer at high-price restaurants.  Women were also 35% less likely to obtain an 
interview with those restaurants.  However, hiring discrimination was not significant at low-price 
restaurants (which offer lower pay).  Neumark, Bank, and Van Nort suggest that employer 
discrimination and customer discrimination are two of the possible sources of this difference in 
hiring.  Bergmann (1986) argues that it is the friction between waitresses and other male 
employees that leads to the segregation of waiters in the high-priced restaurants and waitresses in 
the low-priced restaurants.  “In American restaurants that offer fine food and/or a luxurious 
setting, the size of the check allows for tips big enough to attract male waiters.  In cheaper 
restaurants, the owners put up with the friction rather than supplement the tips to an extent 
necessary to be able to have male waiters” (Bergmann quoted by Neumark, p. 916).    
Blau and Kahn (2000) refer to several court cases indicating that some hiring 
discrimination still exists.  For example, in a 1994 case against Lucky Stores, the judge found 
that “sex discrimination was the standard operating procedure at Lucky with respect to 
placement, promotion, movement to full-time positions, and the allocation of additional hours” 
(Judge Patel quoted by Blau and Kahn, p. 84).  In 2000, the U.S. Information Agency paid a 
large settlement after women were denied high-paying positions in the communications field.  In 
a 1990 case against Price Waterhouse, the judge ruled in favor of a female accountant who was 
rejected for a partnership position despite bringing in more business than the other 88 male 
candidates.   
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Blau and Kahn (2000) also refer to a 1999 study by McDowell, Singell, and Ziliak that 
found evidence of discrimination in academia.  They studied faculty promotion in the economics 
profession and found that even after controlling for quality of Ph.D. training, publishing 
productivity, major field of specialization, current placement in a distinguished department, age, 
and post-Ph.D. experience, female economists were significantly less likely to be promoted from 
assistant to associate professor and from associate to full professor.    
Ginther and Kahn (2004) further explore the treatment of women in academia.  They 
conclude that women in economics are less likely to get tenure and take longer to achieve it.  
They estimate that about 30% of the “promotion gap” can be explained by the fact that women 
economists publish fewer papers than men, especially in nontop journals (Ginther and Kahn 
2004, p. 211).  However, much of the gender promotion gap remains unexplained by observable 
characteristics.   
 
CHAPTER 3 - Sociological Perspectives 
Reaction to Human Capital Theory 
Many sociologists (and some economists) have criticized the traditional human capital 
theory and its role as a primary cause of the differences in earnings between men and women.  In 
previous work, England, Reid, and Kilbourne (1996) found that the gender pay gap widens with 
age, and suggested that it may be because “female-dominated jobs offer less steep wage 
trajectories as experience or seniority accumulates” (England, Reid, and Kilbourne 1996, p. 511).  
Human capital theory reasons that those who plan non-continuous employment will choose a job 
with higher starting wages rather than a job that offers a steep wage trajectory (which may offer 
lower starting wages).  However, England, Reid, and Kilbourne’s research does not support this 
theory; it directly challenges it.  They find that more heavily female jobs actually pay lower 
starting wages.  Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, a fixed-effects 
regression model is used to predict starting wages from the proportion female in the job and from 
control variables.  They conclude that “the sex composition of jobs directly affects their starting 
wages, net of the characteristics of the individuals in the jobs, net of detailed industry, net of 
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occupations’ demands for skill and onerous working conditions, and net of whether the job is 
unionized” (England, Reid, and Kilbourne 1996, p. 520). 
Devaluation of Women’s Work 
Sociologists have argued that women’s work is often devalued, or viewed as less 
important than similar types of work done by males.  Devaluation stems from cultural and 
institutional mechanisms.  “Cultural ideas deprecate work done by women, and cultural beliefs 
lead to cognitive errors in which decision makers underestimate the contribution of female jobs 
to organizational goals, including the goal of increasing profits through increasing productivity” 
(England 2005, p. 278).  Of course, the question arises as to why this unjustified devaluing still 
exists.  One example of women’s work that continues to be devalued is care work, such as child 
care, teaching, health care service, counseling, etc.  England (2005) suggests three reasons for 
the low pay of care work.  The first is the existence of positive externalities that make it difficult 
or impossible to obtain payment from all of the indirect beneficiaries.   
Care providers contribute to the development of human capabilities that are of value not 
only to the client but to all those who interact with him or her.  How could the teacher 
collect from the future employer or spouse of the student who later benefit from her 
labors?  The work of caring is unusual in the extent to which benefits are spread beyond 
direct recipients of the service.  This diffusion makes it easy for others to free ride, 
enjoying the benefits of care without paying its costs, making the work pay less than it 
would without this feature. (England 2005, p. 279) 
The second reason is that the “customers” who most need the care work (children, the 
sick, the disabled, and the elderly) can’t afford to pay much if anything.  Therefore the caring 
labor will be badly paid unless a third party (such as a family member, the state, or a nonprofit) 
subsidizes it.  Finally, care work may be low paying because the quality of care services is 
especially difficult to measure.  Often the recipients of care work (children, elderly, etc.) may not 
be competent enough to judge its quality.  Also, it is difficult for employers to monitor the many 
subtle emotional aspects of care (warmth, nurturance, reassurance, etc.).   
Given the fact that the quality of care is hard to assess, one might ask why care workers 
are not among those who generally receive an efficiency wage.  In such models, higher 
wage costs can be counterbalanced by higher effort, which in turn leads to higher output 
per worker.  The idea is that paying above market-clearing wages may elicit effort more 
cost-effectively than surveillance.  One reason this may not operate for care work is that 
the efficiency-wage strategy hinges on the assumption that average output per worker can 
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be measured, even if individual effort cannot.  In the case of care services, however, 
outputs as well as inputs are difficult to measure. (England 2005, p. 280) 
England, Reid, and Kilbourne (1996) find that the sex composition of jobs is a significant 
determinate of wages, even after controlling for other variables.  As percent female in the 
occupation increases, wage decreases.  Their model suggests that if someone moved from a job 
that was 0% female to one that was 100% female, that person’s wage would decrease by 7% to 
19%, all other things equal (England, Reid, and Kilbourne 1996, p 516).  This provides support 
for the devaluation of women’s work argument.   
Crittenden (2001) also argues that care work, and motherhood in particular, is extremely 
undervalued.  She advocates the addition of unpaid child care to a country’s GDP.     
Economists used to believe that national wealth came from three factors: land, labor, and 
capital.  Now they recognize that human capital, or human knowledge, skills, and 
entrepreneurship, are more important that all others put together.  What is still not 
acknowledged, by economists or the society, is that most human capital is created by 
mothers and other early teachers and caregivers.  Mothers are the most valuable 
producers in the entire economy.  Yet, what they do is not even considered work at all.  
(Interview on Crittenden’s website)   
Discussion 
In general, the sociological perspective has a tendency to emphasize current market 
discrimination.  However, the economic literature tends to be more analytical, and while 
discrimination is recognized as a component of the gender wage gap, there is more emphasis on 
explanatory causes and improvements over time.  Just as sociologists have criticized economic 
explanations, economists also have reason to question the legitimacy of some sociological 
conclusions.  Much of the disagreement stems over the inclusion and classification of relevant 
variables.  For example, time spent out of the labor force may or may not be related to 
discrimination.  As Solberg (1999) found, preferences play a significant role in occupational 
choices.  Furthermore, if a married couple has a child and one of the parents needs to temporarily 
drop out of the labor force, it makes good economic sense for the parent with the lowest 
opportunity cost to be the one staying at home (i.e., the parent with the lower salary, which is 
usually the female).  Additionally, it is hard to place a monetary value on preferences, desires, 
and utility.  The focus on earnings differences is tied to the assumption that more money is 
better.  However, not all people are concerned about maximizing income; some (particularly 
women) may be more interested in maximizing utility.   
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Finally, despite the “proof” of discrimination offered by some sociologists (which in turn 
provides the justification for governmental intervention), market discrimination against women 
cannot be shown to be the primary cause of the gender wage difference.  As mentioned earlier, 
men and women bring many differences to the labor market that are simply unmeasurable, and 
not all studies point directly to discrimination.  For example, Paglin and Rufolo (1990) have a 
plausible quantitative ability theory.  Blau and Kahn (2000) suggest overall income inequality in 
the United States plays an important role.  Solberg (2004) finds very little hiring discrimination, 
and other studies have observed similar pay for men and women when it is broken down into the 
same highly detailed occupation.  “The College Placement Council data show that the mean 
starting salaries for males and females in each narrowly defined field are very close.  The 
unweighted average in all fields shows females earning 97.3% of male salaries” (Paglin and 
Rufolo 1990).   
 
CHAPTER 4 - Policy Recommendations and Their Implications 
 Existing anti-discrimination laws include the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which guarantees 
equal pay for equal work, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits sex-
based employment discrimination.   
The studies on the gender earnings gap (while varied, contradictory, and inconclusive) 
serve as positive substantiation for the normative underlying question: should the government 
play a larger role in employment regulation?   Some conclude “yes,” others answer “no.”  Even 
for those who can agree on “yes,” the proper effective policy is also debatable.  The following 
section will address some suggested policy changes. 
Comparable Worth 
The term “comparable worth” is a vague concept and its exact meaning is difficult to 
define.  In general, comparable worth is a proposed remedy for the earnings differential between 
“male jobs” and “female jobs.”  Comparable worth policies seek to classify jobs on the basis of 
several characteristics (skill level, working conditions, etc.) and ensure that comparable jobs 
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requiring comparable labor will receive equal pay.  This usually means that wages would need to 
be increased for the comparable female-dominated jobs.   
Bergmann (1989) and England, Reid, and Kilbourne (1996) support the argument for 
“comparable worth” policies.  They suggest that these policies are needed to alleviate 
discrimination, particularly the issue of employers setting lower wages when the job is filled 
largely by women.  A job evaluation based on a point system could examine several categories: 
knowledge and skills, mental demands, accountability, and work conditions.  For example, the 
State of Washington conducted evaluations on several occupations in 1974, and their total points 
compared to salary are shown in the table below (Bergmann 1989, p. 56).   
 
Table 4.1: Sample Point System for Comparable Worth 
Occupation Knowledge and Skills 
Mental 
Demands Accountability 
Work 
Conditions 
Total 
Points 
Salary (in 
1985) 
Delivery 
Truck Driver 61 10 13 13 97 $382 
Auto 
Mechanic 106 26 30 13 175 $465 
Secretary 122 35 40 0 197 $306 
Civil 
Engineer 160 53 61 13 287 $513 
Registered 
Nurse 184 70 70 17 341 $411 
Source: State of Washington Comparable Worth Study, 1974. 
 
However, while the intent of comparable worth policies may be admirable, the actual 
outcome could be problematic.  In an article for the Monthly Labor Review titled “Comparable 
Worth: How Do We Know It Will Work?” Carolyn Bell (1985) gives a short answer: we don’t.   
We are completely unable to predict the outcomes of an effective comparable worth 
policy, whether mandated by law or adopted by private decision makers.  Our ignorance 
stems from the lack of data with which to build a viable economic model…Comparable 
worth has frequently been proposed as a solution without clearly defining the problem, 
partly because of insufficient data, and partly because of insufficient analysis of existing 
data. (Bell 1985, p. 5) 
The first problem to arise might be determining exactly what percentage of workers in an 
occupation must be of the same sex for it to be classified as a sex-typed job.  Secondly, 
policymakers (rather than the market) will be trying to define some sort of “just price.”  “This 
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argument comes close to implying that work has an intrinsic or innate value, quite apart from the 
monetary wage it commands in the labor market.  Such a notion is neither statistically 
demonstrable nor part of any economic theory” (Bell 1985, p. 7).  Even if comparable wages can 
be determined and agreed upon for certain occupations, the implementation of those wages will 
interfere with existing market forces.  For example, suppose a job evaluation system suggests 
that secretaries should be paid the same wage as auto mechanics.  A higher wage for secretaries 
could lead to a surplus of labor in that market and a shortage of labor in the auto mechanic 
market.  Then the only way to obtain more auto mechanics would be to offer a pay premium for 
that job.  However, if that happens and more men become auto mechanics, the original problem 
returns where males are earning more than females.   
Furthermore, while there may be some benefits of comparable worth policies, there 
would also be costs.  Explicit costs would likely come in the form of increased labor costs for 
firms in the job categories most affected by a comparable worth wage increase.  Increased labor 
costs could result in higher prices and more unemployment in those markets.  Implicit costs 
could include the perpetuation of occupational sex segregation.  Females would have a reduced 
incentive to enter the traditionally male occupations.   
Stricter Anti-Discrimination Laws 
Although anti-discrimination laws do exist, many argue that it is not enough to address 
the problem of gender discrimination in the labor market.  If barriers to entry are preventing 
women from entering “male” occupations, governmental intervention may be needed to break 
down those barriers.  If hiring discrimination is the problem, affirmative action may be a 
solution.   
Affirmative action is a policy designed to increase the representation of women or 
minorities.  Executive Order 11246 (passed in 1965) requires most companies doing business 
with the federal government to statistically analyze their workforce and identify any areas in 
which women are significantly underrepresented.  Affirmative action plans set forth specific 
goals and timetables for increasing the employment of women in those areas.  Companies failing 
to comply with affirmative action plans can lose government contracts or be banned from 
receiving future contracts (Ragan and Thomas 1993, p. 462). 
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Solberg (1999) believes that because there is relatively little hiring discrimination, public 
policy directed at breaking down barriers to entry will be ineffective. 
Since the estimated gap is similar when aspirations and actual occupations are used, a 
vigorously enforced public policy, directed toward the elimination of the gender gap by 
eliminating hiring discrimination, might be ineffective. Public policy directed toward a 
vigorous enforcement of law that prohibits discriminatory differences in pay may more 
effectively reduce the remaining discriminatory part of the pay gap. (Solberg, 1999, p 
100) 
Therefore, if barriers to entry are not a significant problem, affirmative action is not an 
effective solution.  However, if gender pay discrimination is not clearly evident, then comparable 
worth policies are not a useful solution either.  The trouble with finding a good “solution” is 
determining the exact “problem.”  Hence, if the causes of the gender wage gap are still being 
debated, the proper public policy response will also be uncertain.  
 
CHAPTER 5 - Conclusion 
The issue of the gender earnings gap is multi-dimensional and highly complex.  Various 
economic and sociological studies seem to contradict each other, particularly because 
“discrimination” is impossible to measure directly.  However, the vast literature on the subject 
has lead to some conclusions. 
• The gender pay ratio has improved substantially in recent decades. 
• Men and women participate differently in the labor market. 
→ Women are more likely to have intermittent employment. 
→ Women are more concentrated in the lower paying occupations. 
• The earnings gap between men and women likely reflects a combination of 
differences in human capital, occupational field, societal responsibilities, and 
social norms. 
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 Despite the large number of studies on the gender earnings gap, certain questions remain.   
• How much of the earnings difference is related to preference and choice? 
• How much of the difference is caused by pre-market discrimination? 
• Do women experience a significant amount of current market discrimination? 
• Should the government play a larger role in the equalization of pay in the labor 
market? 
• What types of policies, if any, would decrease discrimination without disrupting 
equilibrium in the labor market? 
• Is more research needed on this issue, or is it something that can never be resolved? 
 
The disagreement among economists and sociologists is a result of elusive data and 
differing opinions.  George Bernard Shaw may be right, and a definitive conclusion about the 
gender earnings gap will never be reached. 
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